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In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon, academics and policymakers were quick to dismiss the strategic role that 
deterrence could play in U.S. counterterrorism policy. President George Bush’s often 
quoted conclusion that traditional concepts of deterrence are meaningless against 
“shadowy terrorist networks” with no nation to defend and who are willing to engage in 
“wanton destruction” resonated throughout discussions on U.S. national security 
strategy. A 2002 RAND report asserted, “Deterrence is both too limiting and too naïve 
to be applicable to the war on terrorism.”1 Since September 11, deterrent strategies have 
repeatedly been characterized as relics of the Cold War era of superpower confrontation. 
As a result, the White House has focused on defensive and preemptive counterterrorism 
strategies. The current administration argues that the U.S. can no longer wait for the 
worst security threats, such as terrorists acquiring chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear weapons (CBRN), to materialize before acting.  
Alternatively, many commentators and researchers, especially in the field of political 
science, maintain that deterrence remains a viable and utilizable tool in U.S. 
policymakers’ arsenal to combat terrorism. Regardless of which side of the fence 
analysis falls on this issue, however, an important aspect of the deterring terrorism 
argument receives very little attention – the role that ideals and values play in America’s 
ability to establish a deterrent mechanism against terrorists. I argue that deterrence, as 
a strategic concept, is not inapplicable to defending against terrorism; however, the U.S. 
would face considerable legal and moral quandaries if it were to carry out the necessary 
policies to deter terrorists and their supporters. To be sure, some elements of a terrorist 
organization can be deterred, but it is unlikely that U.S. policymakers are willing to 
sacrifice core American values in order to credibly signal to these actors that something 
“they hold dear” is in jeopardy if they commit or support terrorist aggression. To 
establish a deterrent mechanism against terrorist networks the U.S. would be required 
to explore a number of extremely heavy-handed policy options, such as regime change, 
nuclear retaliations, and expanding targeted killing operations to included terrorists’ 
family members and loved ones. 
Implementing policies such as these are the only ways to effectively deter elements of 
a terrorist organization and its support structure. Nevertheless, doing so would force the 
U.S. to take certain positions that would come into conflict with American ideals and 
beliefs about justice, fairness, and human rights. Moreover, policy pronouncements that 
could deter terrorists would be inflammatory and would most likely be met with 
considerable domestic and international criticism. Even when the U.S. has “skirted” 
some of these policies in recent years to combat terrorism, controversy and 
disagreement have emerged over the morality and legality of such actions.  
The simplistic argument that terrorists cannot be deterred is reductionist. 
Additionally, those who argue that deterrence maintains significant utility in the U.S. 
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war on terror fail to acknowledge the level of harshness and brutality required of U.S. 
policy to establish a deterrent mechanism against members of terrorist networks. What 
really prevents the U.S. from deterring terrorists is not the simple unsuitability of the 
strategic concept of deterrence, but America’s humanity, civility, and idealism. 
DETERRENCE AND TERRORISM 
By now, the arguments are familiar for why deterring a group such as al-Qaeda is a 
complex endeavor. First, terrorists are highly motivated and therefore they are willing to 
risk anything – their lives in the case of suicide-bombers – to accomplish a goal. Second, 
the political goals of terrorist groups are often very broad, idealistic, ambiguous, or 
unclear. Third, terrorists are difficult to locate. Terrorist networks operate trans-
nationally and therefore make reprisals difficult to “return to sender.” Fourth, it remains 
undecided how deterrence can work against an enemy that understands that the 
ultimate policy goal of the U.S. is not to coexist with groups like al-Qaeda, but to 
eradicate them. Finally, terrorists often attempt to incite retaliation. Terrorists have 
used the collateral damage caused by retaliatory efforts to foment more support for their 
organization or broader cause. In total, the deck is stacked against deterrence playing a 
significant role in U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
While most post-September 11 analyses conclude that deterrence is of little use 
against terrorists, some maintain that the “death of deterrence” has been exaggerated 
and that deterrence can remain a key component in the war on terror.2 One rationale for 
the argument that deterrence is not “dead” is that September 11 did not illustrate the 
irrelevance of deterrence, but rather that U.S. foreign policy throughout the 1980s and 
1990s had failed to communicate to al-Qaeda that the U.S. was willing and able to inflict 
significant suffering on terrorist transgressors. That is, deterrence did not fail; rather 
the U.S. had failed to establish an effective deterrent mechanism against al-Qaeda. As 
President Bush noted in 2001, “It was clear that bin Laden felt emboldened, and didn't 
feel threatened by the United States.”3  
The list of instances in which the U.S. was attacked by Islamic radicals but failed to 
retaliate in any meaningful manner is well known: Tehran in 1979, Beirut in 1983, the 
World Trade Center in 1993, the Khobar Towers in 1996, the U.S. embassies in East 
Africa in 1998, and the USS Cole in 2000. All of these cases evoked principled lectures 
and saber-rattling by U.S. presidents on how the U.S. must fight terrorism, yet rarely 
were these strong proclamations accompanied by actual deeds. Furthermore, the events 
that unfolded in Somalia in 1993 signaled to U.S. enemies that the U.S. was unwilling to 
suffer costs in blood to realize its policy goals. Some even argue the U.S. continues to be 
afflicted by a “Vietnam syndrome.” This reticence to retaliate and aversion to casualties 
did not go unnoticed by al-Qaeda’s leadership. Osama bin Laden repeatedly painted the 
U.S. as a “paper tiger,” a country more apt to growl than bite.  
The second argument made for the continued applicability of deterrence is that 
terrorist networks are hierarchical organizational structures. Terrorist organizations are 
comprised of many actors, each with different responsibilities, roles, and motivations.  
The fanatical individuals who carry out suicide bombings or other types of attacks 
represent only a small portion of a terrorist organization. Many other actors, such as 
financiers, recruiters, leaders, religious figures, and state supporters are also important 
components of a terrorist organization. These different elements have come to be known 
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as the “al-Qaeda system.” It is suggested that while the “foot soldier” who is willing to 
blow him/herself up in a crowded marketplace is probably undeterrable, deterrence may 
be possible against other entities that comprise a terrorist network. Some actors within a 
terrorist network may have a clearer cost-benefit conceptualization, possess assets that 
are more easily targeted, or are simply less motivated than other elements within the 
organization. 
Although terrorist networks should be understood as complex organizations, the 
dilemma of effectively deterring the actors who comprise a terrorist system remains. 
First, security strategists must distinguish what these diverse actors actually value. 
Second, defense planners must establish a meaningful threat of punishment in the event 
of a terrorist attack against the U.S. or its interests. As Thomas Schelling noted, “To 
exploit a capacity for hurting and inflicting damage one needs to know what an 
adversary treasures and what scares him.”4 The U.S. must be able to credibly 
communicate and signal to the different actors in a terrorist network that what they 
value will be put at risk. Bombing baby formula factories in the Sudan and empty tents 
in Afghanistan, as the U.S. did in response to the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa, 
does not constitute damaging what terrorist elements hold dear. Establishing a 
deterrent mechanism requires not just any retaliation, but focused and consequential 
retaliation.   
Recent comments by French President Jacques Chirac and Colorado Congressman 
Tom Tancredo intensified the debate over how retaliatory threats are communicated to 
terrorists. President Chirac, speaking at a submarine base in Brittany in January 2006, 
stated that France was prepared to carry out a nuclear strike against any country that 
sponsors a terrorist attack against French interests. Chirac went on to say that France’s 
nuclear arsenal is now organized to include the ability to retaliate against a terrorist 
attack with tactical nuclear strikes.5 President Chirac was clearly sending a warning to 
Iran and various Arab countries that continue to support terrorist organizations. In a 
more reckless assertion, Congressman Tom Tancredo stated in 2005 on a Florida radio 
talk show that the U.S. could consider “taking out” Muslim holy sites if terrorists 
attacked the U.S. with nuclear devices. Both comments created a public storm, as many 
observers quickly labeled these statements irresponsible. 
Notwithstanding the merit or lack thereof of such comments, the response that these 
statements engendered revealed another problem with the possibility of establishing a 
deterrent mechanism against terrorists. Because effective deterrence requires the U.S. to 
directly threaten targets of value to terrorist elements, a dilemma arises: whether the 
U.S. would be willing to carry out the necessary actions to credibly communicate to 
terrorist elements that what they value is at risk if terrorist acts occur. What targets 
must the U.S. threaten for a potential terrorist element to estimate that the costs of 
carrying out a course of action are unacceptably high? Is the U.S. prepared to implement 
policies that may evoke strong dissent from certain segments of the domestic and 
international community? Can the U.S. credibly threaten these targets without crossing 
certain ethical, political, and legal boundaries of behavior?  
U.S. foreign policy has always been a manifestation and extension of the basic values, 
principles, and beliefs on which the American republic was founded.6 In dealing with 
terrorists, the U.S. has sought rational, reasoned, and relatively proportional responses 
in order to maintain the respect of the international community and its own citizens. 
However, to deter certain terrorist elements the U.S. will ultimately find it necessary to 
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compromise certain democratic values that have long guided its foreign policymaking. 
Because the U.S. cares about projecting an image of virtue, it is unlikely that it will ever 
truly be able to put at risk what terrorist elements value. The current war on terrorism 
has already revealed the inherent conflict between maintaining a foreign policy that 
reflects the reality of U.S. capabilities while remaining dedicated to democratic ideals.  
As Clifford Kupchan has argued, Americans want both a muscular and moral foreign 
policy.7 
Unfortunately, measures that may prove functional in establishing a deterrent 
mechanism against a group like al-Qaeda may not be viable in light of the core values of 
the country, even in a time of war. The politically incorrect promise of violent retaliation 
following a terrorist attack is the only significant course of action when attempting to 
establish a deterrent mechanism against members of the al-Qaeda system.8 Those who 
argue that deterrence is still relevant in dealing with terrorism fail to consider the actual 
policies the U.S. will have to pursue in order to deter terrorists from carrying out violent 
acts.  
Most examinations of deterrence and U.S. counterterrorism policy make the common 
argument that the U.S. will have to communicate a clear message of punishment against 
terrorist elements, without actually considering toward whom and where these threats 
should be directed. Moreover, in those instances where authors consider targets of 
retaliation, potential threats of punishment rarely strike at what terrorists truly hold 
dear. Frequently, policy recommendations represent little more than establishing 
obstacles to terrorist networks, not meaningful attempts to change the decision-calculus 
of terrorist elements. The targets the U.S. will be forced to retaliate against and the 
manner in which these targets will have to be engaged may render the moral price of 
establishing a real deterrent mechanism too high. Deterrence is impossible against 
terrorists, not because it is theoretically inapplicable, but because the U.S. is too 
concerned with maintaining its moral authority in the world. The aspiration of the U.S. 
to take the “moral high road” will signal to terrorists that the things they value most are 
actually not in grave danger. When attempting to deter terrorists the “ethical and 
necessary” ultimately will collide. 
Deterring State Supporters 
Deterring state sponsors of international terrorist organizations presents perhaps the 
most theoretically straightforward attempt to utilize deterrent strategies in the war on 
terrorism. Even those who are generally skeptical of deterrence being applied to 
terrorism believe the U.S. may be able to deter states from harboring or supporting 
terrorist organizations. Of the many elements that comprise a terrorist network, rogue 
regimes that support terrorists are the easiest to find. Assets of a rogue regime that can 
be targeted, such as the territory under its control or the lives of the ruling elite, are 
more apparent than the assets held by individual members of terrorist organizations. 
Efforts to dissuade states from forming relationships with terrorists also represent one 
of the critical aspects of the war on terrorism. Indeed, only days after the September 11 
attacks, President Bush articulated what came to be known as the Bush Doctrine: “Any 
nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United 
States as a hostile regime.”9 
The most salient concern for U.S. defense planners is the prospect of rogue states 
providing CBRN to a group such as al-Qaeda. The U.S. currently lists six countries as 
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potential state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Syria, North Korea, Cuba, and Sudan. In 
2006 the U.S. State Department removed Libya because it apparently was assisting the 
U.S. in its war on terror. It appears that over the past few years, state sponsorship of 
terrorist organizations has waned. Libya, for example, has been cooperating with the 
U.S. to find Libyan members of al-Qaeda. Even more noteworthy, in December 2003, 
Colonel Muammar Qaddafi stated that the Libyan government would cease research and 
development of CBRN and would allow weapons inspectors to confirm its 
disarmamanent efforts. While the impetus for such positive steps are multifaceted, the 
U.S. success in ousting the Taliban from power and killing many of its members in 
Afghanistan has “served notice” to rogue regimes around the world that the U.S. is 
willing and able to destroy what rogue regimes value. Moreover, the possibility of 
Saddam Hussein acquiring CBRN and then passing these capabilities along to terrorists 
was a significant rationale for the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Many argue that Libya’s decision 
to dismantle its CBRN programs and other governments’ decisions to ratchet up the 
pressure they exert on al-Qaeda cells within their borders is at least partly due to a 
growing fear that U.S. military force might be used against regimes that continue to 
harbor terrorist organizations.10 As Vice President Dick Cheney stated in the 2004 vice 
presidential debate with John Edwards, the Libyan decision to abandon its CBRN 
programs was one of the “great by-products” of U.S. actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.11 
While it appears that U.S. military operations and legal actions since September 11 
have established a deterrent mechanism against state sponsorship of terrorism, the 
threat of these initiatives remains a critical concern to policymakers. Osama bin Laden 
has voiced an interest in acquiring mass-casualty weapons and many analysts suggest 
that al-Qaeda would not hesitate to use CBRN weapons if it acquired these capabilities. 
To do so, however, terrorist groups need help, either by smuggling CBRN materials from 
poorly secured facilities or by developing relationships with foreign governments willing 
to transfer CBRN capabilities. Thus far, it appears that al-Qaeda’s pursuit of CBRN 
capabilities has been unsuccessful. In 2002, The New York Times reported that U.S. 
administration officials stated that “…analysis of suspected radioactive substances 
seized in Afghanistan has found nothing to prove that Osama bin Laden reached his 
decade-long goal of acquiring nuclear materials for a bomb.”12 However, U.S. 
intelligence agencies suspect that Pakistani scientists gave al-Qaeda members 
information on how to construct a radiological weapon, or “dirty bomb.”13 North Korea 
increased the fear of a state transferring weapons materials, when in 2003 it threatened 
to sell a quantity of plutonium to the highest bidder. Additionally, as Iran is on the cusp 
of developing nuclear capabilities, this scenario is becoming even more critical to U.S. 
defense planners.   
Currently, the U.S. maintains a position of “calculated ambiguity” on how it will 
respond to a CBRN attack on its soil or against its interests abroad. The doctrine of 
calculated ambiguity garnered support when the Bush administration purportedly 
deterred Saddam Hussein from using biological or chemical weapons against U.S. forces 
during the first Gulf War in 1991. Secretary of State James Baker delivered a note to 
Iraq’s Foreign minister Tariq Aziz that cautioned Hussein that any use of these weapons 
could result in U.S. nuclear reprisals. The unclassified version of the 2002 National 
Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 17 declares that the U.S. will reserve the right to 
respond with “overwhelming force” and keep open “all of its options” to a CBRN attack 
on the U.S., its interests, or its allies. In 2003, The Washington Times reported that the 
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classified version of NSPD 17 made the willingness of the U.S. to respond with nuclear 
weapons to a CBRN attack more explicit.14 Nevertheless, the U.S. is deliberately vague 
about its plans to respond to a CBRN attack. The strategic rationale for maintaining this 
ambiguity is to keep open a broad range of response options and approach potential 
events on a case-by-case basis. The vagueness of U.S. reprisal plans, however, does not 
support deterrence. The credibility of U.S. threats to retaliate suffers as a result of this 
ambiguity. While the use of language such as “overwhelming force” connotes a severe 
retaliation, this lack of clarity is not the best way to solidify the belief among terrorist-
supporting regimes that their behavior puts them at severe risk. As one author notes, 
“Frequently, the bigger and more indiscriminate the threat, the less believable it is in the 
eyes of the target audience.”15  
In order to establish a deterrent mechanism that will dissuade rogue states from 
supporting terrorist organizations, the U.S. must develop a strong declaratory policy 
that clearly communicates a threat of punishment for those states that provide CBRN 
materials to terrorists. Strategies for dealing with rogue states assisting terrorist 
organizations that are severe and target assets of value to the regime will best reinforce 
deterrent mechanisms. As Ian Lesser argues, for deterrence to be viable against rogue 
regimes, the threat of retaliation for supporting or sheltering terrorist organizations 
must be both “massive” and “personal to the leadership.”16 The U.S. policy of calculated 
ambiguity reinforces many of the internationally held stereotypes of the U.S. that 
negatively affect its ability to establish a credible deterrent threat. By avoiding direct 
language, the U.S. appears irresolute, noncommittal, and perhaps overly sensitive to 
public opinion. 
To create a credible deterrent threat, the U.S. must articulate a policy of regime 
change in those states that offer support to terrorist groups. Regimes that assist groups 
such as al-Qaeda, especially if this assistance is with acquiring CBRN capabilities, must 
know that they will be toppled and replaced if this support is identified. Specifically, the 
leadership of rogue regimes must be explicitly warned that they will be removed from 
power, suffer legal repercussions, or even be killed for maintaining ties with terrorist 
groups. Doing so would represent a meaningful threat of punishment to the leadership 
of rogue regimes. However, a stated policy of regime change presents numerous 
dilemmas. Most notably, sovereignty is still a revered concept in international relations. 
Engaging in a war to bring about regime change is acceptable in the international 
community only in instances of clear self-defense or through the decision of the United 
Nations Security Council.17 Thus, in order to have international support to carry out a 
regime change, the U.S. would have to bring forth evidence that a particular state was 
responsible for transferring CBRN capabilities to a terrorist group that carried out an 
attack on the United States.  
Making the case for regime change in Afghanistan was easy, as it was fairly clear to 
the international community that the U.S. was retaliating against a regime guilty of 
harboring and providing sanctuary to al-Qaeda. However, future attempts to gain 
international approval for regime change may be more difficult than they were in 
Afghanistan. The failure to garner widespread international support for the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq and the subsequent failure to find CBRN weapons will only serve to 
make the international community more skeptical of U.S.-led efforts to topple rogue 
regimes. Furthermore, the difficulties the U.S. has had in “winning the peace” in Iraq 
will decrease the credibility of U.S. threats to dismantle rogue regimes. The ruling elite 
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in rogue regimes may be unconvinced of the willingness of the U.S. to topple a regime 
and engage in another nation-building effort. These arguments correspond with the 
often-heard suggestion that U.S. policy in Iraq has undermined its ability to fight the 
war on terror in other parts of the world. 
In addition to articulating a policy of regime change, the U.S. must be more explicit in 
its capability and willingness to respond with nuclear weapons in the event of a CBRN 
attack. It remains uncertain whether the U.S. is likely to retaliate against an enemy that 
has used CBRN with either conventional or nuclear weapons. The psychological weight 
that the ultimate sanction of nuclear reprisals carries is critical in developing a 
meaningful deterrent threat against rogue regimes transferring CBRN capabilities to 
terrorists. As one author suggests, “The extremely high costs that a rogue state might 
suffer from nuclear retaliation should give even the most reckless of regimes pause 
before sharing a nuclear capability with terrorists.”18 Threatening a massive 
conventional weapon response simply does not carry the same deterrent weight as the 
threat of nuclear reprisals. However, current U.S. nuclear capabilities prevent the U.S. 
from convincingly threatening nuclear retaliations against rogue regimes. The U.S. 
nuclear arsenal is too destructive to consider using, other than in retaliation to a nuclear 
attack. Because the U.S. nuclear arsenal consists primarily of weapons that have yields 
of hundreds of kilotons, U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons, especially in response to a 
biological or chemical weapon attack, are too incredible for rogue regime leaders to take 
seriously. Ambiguous threats about leaving the nuclear option open, when many 
enemies of the U.S. maintain little belief that the U.S. is willing to take action on these 
veiled threats, fails to support deterrence. The U.S. cannot credibly threaten nuclear 
reprisals against a CBRN attack because it is perceived the U.S. would not risk the 
extensive collateral damage and civilian casualties that would result from using the 
weapons in its current nuclear arsenal. Rogue regimes may rely on this moral and 
political reluctance by the U.S. when they consider transferring CBRN capabilities to 
terrorists.  
In order for the nuclear option to be a credible part of the strategic menu, the U.S. 
must continue research on, and eventually development of, low yield nuclear weapons. 
Next generation “mini-nukes” could theoretically engage targets such as underground 
command and control bunkers, weapon labs, CBRN storage facilities, or even a 
presidential complex. As U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have illustrated, the 
war on terror will often present high-value targets that cannot be efficiently engaged 
with conventional munitions.  
The development of mini-nukes and subsequent establishment of a declaratory policy 
of nuclear retaliation is a potentially divisive issue. First, the 1993 Spratt-Furse law bans 
any research and development of nuclear weapons that have yields of less than five 
kilotons. In May 2003 the House of Representatives adjusted the law, allowing research 
on low-yield nuclear weapons, but stated clearly that development and production of 
these weapons remains prohibited. Second, the mini-nuke debate polarizes the positions 
of “deterrence hawks” and “nonproliferation doves.” The production of mini-nukes blurs 
the line between nuclear and conventional munitions. It also creates a number of 
nuclear fallout concerns and undercuts U.S. counterproliferation efforts. For instance, 
the U.S. government, through the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
extension conference, assured that it would not use nor threaten the use of nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear members of the NPT. Third, some scholars, notably Scott 
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Sagan, argue that explicitly threatening nuclear retaliation could lead to a “commitment 
trap” whereby U.S. officials may feel that they must respond to an attack with nuclear 
weapons in order not to “lose face” domestically and internationally.19 Finally, since 
WWII, a nuclear taboo has emerged in the U.S. and throughout much of the 
international community, whereby a normative prohibition stigmatizes the use of 
nuclear weapons as something only done by “bad states.” Therefore, some suggest that 
by producing nuclear weapons that are designed for non-nuclear targets, the U.S. may 
undermine the nuclear taboo. 
A second important step in establishing a credible threat of retaliation involves CBRN 
weapon attribution. To effectively deter states from transferring CBRN materials to 
terrorists, the U.S. needs to develop its ability to identify the origin of the CBRN 
materials used in an attack against the U.S. The prospect of an unattributed CBRN 
attack poses a significant dilemma for establishing a deterrent mechanism. As Michael 
Levi argues, the U.S. must develop its ability to identify where the materials used in a 
CBRN attack originated. While intercepting weapon transfers before they occur should 
be the primary goal, the U.S. must have the technical ability to identify where CBRN 
materials came from after they have been detonated. As Levi points out, “If the United 
States can take that technical step, it can credibly assure its enemies that their transfer 
of weapons to terrorists will ultimately lead to their demise.”20  Without adequate 
attribution ability, rogue regimes may be more inclined to transfer CBRN capabilities to 
a terrorist organization because they believe their identity may never be revealed.  As 
long as rogue regimes believe the U.S. cannot detect where CBRN materials originated, 
U.S. threats of retaliation are somewhat hollow. 
While continued efforts by the Defense Department to develop a more robust 
attribution system are vital, the infancy of this capability requires the U.S. to make a 
much more controversial threat in the near-term. It is not certain that the U.S. will 
always be able to garner enough forensic evidence from a CBRN attack to pinpoint the 
origins of these weapons after an attack has been carried out. There is a lingering 
question of how compelling forensic evidence must have to be in order to justify a 
massive retaliation against a state suspected of providing CBRN assistance to a terrorist 
organization. To establish an effective deterrent mechanism the answer to this question 
violates accepted legal standards. The U.S. will need to be prepared to retaliate on the 
basis of limited or imperfect information about the origins of weapons material. That is, 
the burden of proof will have to be relaxed. As a recent RAND report conjectures, in the 
event of a CBRN attack the U.S. may be forced to retaliate based upon “…reasonable 
evidence and would even make some assumptions about who is supporting terrorists in 
possession of WMD.”21 U.S. retaliation would have to come in spite of there being some 
doubt about where the CBRN capabilities actually originated. A U.S. decision to retaliate 
against state targets based on imperfect information will undoubtedly fan anti-American 
flames around the world and may even generate substantial domestic dissent. This is 
especially likely in light of the fact that the current White House toppled Saddam 
Hussein’s regime despite considerable questions about Iraq’s CBRN capabilities and 
development programs. The Kay Report has raised serious questions about the existence 
of ties between Iraq, al-Qaeda, and CBRN.22       
Attribution difficulties present another, even more controversial, issue in terms of 
deterring states from transferring CBRN capabilities to terrorists.  In addition to 
threatening massive retaliation and regime change against state supporters of terrorism, 
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the U.S. must also develop a doctrine of retaliation against CBRN proliferators that do 
not adhere to international standards of securing CBRN materials. Even with the 
establishment of certain enticements through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
framework, or Nunn-Lugar legislation, a number of states have not developed the 
necessary safeguards to secure critical weapons materials. Pakistan and Russia, for 
example, continue to maintain fissile nuclear material facilities that are poorly secured. 
Moreover, the CTR and other nonproliferation efforts have failed to prevent Iran and 
North Korea from pursuing nuclear capabilities.  A comprehensive deterrent strategy 
would also threaten retaliation against those states that jeopardize international security 
by not conforming to international standards of safeguarding CBRN materials. That is, 
the “mere” crime of negligence and carelessness in overseeing CBRN materials must be 
punished. This is especially true in the event the U.S. cannot identify the origin of CBRN 
materials used in an attack. The U.S. must clearly communicate its willingness to 
severely punish those states that, because of mismanagement of CBRN, risk the loss or 
theft of critical materials from their storage facilities. Such a policy stance would be 
extremely contentious and may damage the relationship the U.S. has with a number of 
states. However, until CBRN attribution becomes certain, to establish a meaningful 
deterrent mechanism against states that knowingly transfer sensitive materials the U.S. 
must also threaten those states that do not adequately secure their CBRN materials.  
The above discussion illustrates that establishing a deterrent mechanism, even in the 
theoretically most applicable case of deterring states from supporting terrorist 
organizations, would require the U.S. to adopt a number of controversial policies. To 
establish a meaningful deterrent mechanism against rogue regimes from supporting 
terrorist groups, the U.S. must take the following steps: (1) explicitly state that the U.S. 
will dismantle and destroy any regime guilty of supporting terrorist organizations, (2) 
increase research and development of mini-nukes and clearly communicate its 
willingness to retaliate with these weapons in the event of a CRBN attack, (3) develop a 
robust CBRN attribution system, and (4) warn states that do not maintain adequate 
security over CBRN materials and weapons that they will be punished in the event the 
U.S. is unable to identify the origins of a CBRN weapon used in an attack. Clearly, a 
number of these policies would be unpopular to many around the world.  The uproar 
generated by President Chirac’s and Congressman Tancredo’s recent comments 
illustrates the potential problems with articulating a policy of massive retaliation and 
regime change. Moreover, the U.S. cannot make a credible threat of nuclear retaliation 
to a chemical or biological attack because its current nuclear arsenal is comprised 
mostly of weapons that are far too destructive.  Making a credible threat becomes even 
more difficult when retaliation may have to be carried out on the basis of incomplete 
information about who exactly was responsible for giving  a terrorist organization CBRN 
capabilities. With the current difficulties of CBRN attribution, and the fact that a 
number of states that do not directly support terrorist activities are negligent in securing 
CBRN materials, the ability of the U.S. to communicate a clear and believable retaliatory 
threat is further hampered. There exists too much opportunity at the present time for 
rogue regimes to transfer CBRN capabilities to terrorists without detection and 
therefore without fear of reprisals. Until these opportunities are reduced, or the U.S. is 
willing to communicate and carry out a number of potentially unpopular policy choices, 
effectively deterring states from forming any relationship with terrorist groups is 
unlikely. 
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A final problem with deterring state sponsorship of terrorism is unrelated to the 
myriad of issues that surface in regard to CBRN weapons. One of the biggest difficulties 
policymakers and analysts face is that state sponsorship of terrorism can include a wide 
spectrum of actions and degrees – ranging from very passive to very active. Even more 
problematic is that some states that maintain some degree of support for terrorist 
organizations are loosely considered U.S. allies.23 For example, Pakistan’s intelligence 
service and military are known to sympathize with and at times directly support active 
Islamist terrorist groups in Kashmir. One such group, the al-Qaeda splinter group Jaish-
e-Mohammed, has been linked to the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament 
and the 2002 murder of New York Times journalist Daniel Pearl. Therefore, to establish 
a credible deterrent mechanism, the U.S. would have to be willing to clearly signal to a 
number of its “allies” in regions such as the Middle East that it is prepared to carry out 
regime change or other drastic policy responses to even low-levels of passive support. 
Many countries, including purported U.S. allies in the war on terror, continue to “turn 
the other cheek” to terrorists operating within their borders because they simply do not 
believe or fear that the U.S. will punish them in a meaningful manner. 
Deterring Individual Elements  
Beyond state supporters, other notable elements that comprise a terrorist organization 
may include financiers, recruiters, religious leaders, “foot soldiers,” and the actual 
leadership of these groups. Deterring these actors is even more problematic than 
deterring rogue regimes from developing ties with terrorists. Deterring states from 
supporting terrorist groups would force the U.S. to adopt a number of potentially 
unpopular policy positions. However, the requirements to deter individuals within a 
terrorist system will force policymakers to compromise some very basic and sacrosanct 
American values.  
The clearest example of this potential tension involves the issue of “targeted killings” 
of members of terrorist organizations. Targeted killings refer to operations carried out 
with governmental approval that seek to eliminate specific individuals who are 
considered to be serious threats to national security. A targeted killing differs from 
assassination in that assassination is the killing of a head of state or prominent political 
figure. Assassination is also a killing characterized by “treacherous” methods. In spite of 
this attempt at differentiation, the actual distinction between the two acts is largely a 
semantic one.  
The issue of targeted killings has garnered considerable attention in recent years for a 
number of reasons. Israel has conducted targeted killings throughout much of its 
history. However, a wave of targeted killing operations carried out by Israel since the 
beginning of the second intifada in September 2000 has drawn increased attention to 
these methods. Israeli agents have recently used a variety of tactics, including car 
bombs, sniper bullets, helicopter gunship attacks, and booby traps, to kill individual 
members of Hezbollah and Hamas. Since September 11 the Bush Administration has 
also attempted to expand U.S. ability to target individual terrorist leaders and 
operatives. Administration officials argue that the U.S. must have more leeway to 
conduct targeted killings in order to punish members of an increasingly decentralized 
al-Qaeda organization. A main component of U.S. targeted killings has been the use of 
CIA-operated Predator drones. The January 13, 2006, Predator attack on targets in the 
Pakistani village of Damadola that sought to kill al-Qaeda’s deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri 
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was especially controversial. The attacks failed to kill al-Zawahiri and reportedly left 
eighteen civilians, including five children, dead.  Even Steven Spielberg’s recent motion 
picture, Munich, about Israeli commandos hunting down and killing the Palestinians 
responsible for the slaying of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics, has thrust 
the issue of targeted killings into mainstream discourse. 
The primary goal of the U.S. should usually be to arrest terrorist leaders and 
operatives. These individuals can be interrogated to obtain intelligence about other 
members of the organization and plans for future attacks. However, it is often too risky 
or even impossible to apprehend or capture terrorist operatives. If apprehending a 
member of a terrorist organization significantly endangers U.S. personnel, and there are 
no other feasible alternatives, then targeted killings are an option. Many Islamic 
fundamentalist groups are currently located in areas of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, 
Central Asia, and Africa where it would be dangerous for U.S. forces to try and 
apprehend them. A declared policy of targeted killing is vital, although controversial, to 
establishing a deterrent mechanism. 
Some commentators have suggested that one of the main reasons that deterrence is 
irrelevant when it comes to fighting terrorists is that many of these individuals are 
prepared to die for their cause. Therefore, it is assumed that retaliatory threats of 
punishment mean little to individuals who are willing to give their lives in the first place. 
However, this reflects a narrow view of terrorist organizations. Besides suicide bombers, 
who may be impelled by the promise of martyrdom, other elements who comprise a 
group such as al-Qaeda are more risk-averse. Osama bin Laden, and other members of 
al-Qaeda’s leadership, for instance, have not carried out suicide bombing missions nor 
attempted to engage U.S. forces in Afghanistan’s mountains. Indeed, many members of 
al-Qaeda’s leadership have literally been running for their lives since the September 11 
attacks. Some analysts have pointed to the 2002 surrender of hundreds of members of 
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to Israeli forces during large-scale military engagements in 
Jenin as evidence that many members of terrorist groups are not willing to give their 
lives.  
Because the lives of individuals within a terrorist organization represents one of the 
few assets that the U.S. may be able to hold at risk, the U.S. must maintain the option of 
carrying out targeted killing operations. A declared U.S. policy of selective killings may 
compel terrorist leaders to consider the utility of engaging in terrorist activities. 
However, establishing an effective deterrent mechanism against potential actors will 
require the U.S. to be much more forthright in its intent to carry out targeted killing 
operations. It is essential that the U.S. explicitly affirm that it will kill members of 
terrorist groups that U.S. intelligence analysts believe are responsible for carrying out 
terrorist attacks against its assets or interests. The U.S. should also make clear that it 
will target members of a terrorist organization other than just senior leaders, such as 
those responsible for providing financial or logistical support to a terrorist organization. 
Broadening the scope of targeted killings beyond just senior leaders may serve to deter 
individuals who are merely “casual sympathizers” from committing to groups like al-
Qaeda. To make these threats credible the U.S. should continue to seek and, when it 
cannot capture alive, kill all senior leaders of al-Qaeda who played a role in 
orchestrating the September 11 attacks. The U.S. has successfully tracked and killed a 
number of al-Qaeda leaders since September 11. However, to deter terrorism the U.S. 
must expand its capabilities to kill terrorist operatives. The Predator program 
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represents but one option the U.S. can explore to credibly threaten the lives of 
individual al-Qaeda members. Current political constraints, however, impede the ability 
of U.S. intelligence agencies and the military from carrying out focused covert 
operations to hunt down and kill terrorist transgressors. Until the constraints on these 
operations are relaxed even further, the U.S. will be unable to establish a deterrent 
mechanism that is functional, effective, and forthcoming with deterrent results.  
While the morality of targeted killings remains a hotly contested issue, it appears that 
targeted killings do influence terrorists. Since 2002, for example, Palestinian leaders 
have repeatedly called for Israeli forces to cease carrying out these operations. On 
January 30, 2002, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon met with a number of Palestinian 
leaders. One of the primary demands of the Palestinian leaders was for Israel to 
immediately stop targeted killings.24 Some analysts argue that targeted killings have 
been directly responsible for decreasing threats to Israel’s national security. It appears 
that Egyptian terrorist infiltration of Israel in the 1950s decreased when Israeli agents 
killed the Egyptian intelligence officers who oversaw the operation. Retaliation against 
the Black September terrorists in the 1970s who killed Israeli athletes in Munich 
virtually destroyed the organization.25 Since the beginning of the second intifada in 
September 2000, empirical evidence suggests that Israel’s targeted killing campaign has 
been successful. As cited by Daniel Byman in his timely 2006 Foreign Affairs article on 
the efficacy of targeted killings, the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism reported that Hamas killed twenty-one Israeli civilians in 2005. This number 
was a fairly sharp drop-off from the sixty-seven who were killed in 2004, forty-five in 
2003, 185 in 2002, and seventy-five in 2001. It is believed by many, especially in Israel, 
that Israeli targeted killings have “shattered Palestinian terrorist groups” and made it 
difficult for these groups to orchestrate large-scale suicide attacks.26 
The individuals who actually carry out violent terrorist acts represent the most 
difficult group to establish a deterrent mechanism against. Unlike other members of a 
terrorist group, “foot soldiers” are often willing to give their lives for the organization’s 
cause and achieve martyrdom. To these individuals, the prospect of dying “in battle” 
against the perceived infidel is considered a great honor. Therefore, threatening to kill 
these individuals would likely do very little to deter them from continuing to carry out 
suicide missions or other types of violent acts.  However, achieving martyrdom is only 
part of the motivation for suicide bombers to give their lives; giving one’s life in battle 
against the infidel results in monetary rewards for a martyr’s family members. Many 
martyr’s families are compensated with payments usually ranging between $12,000 and 
$15,000. Furthermore, significant psychological benefits are derived from a family 
member giving his/her life in these struggles. The act of martyrdom is considered a 
heroic deed and results in glorious funeral ceremonies and the immortalization of the 
individual through graffiti, portraits, trading cards, and other memorabilia.27  
Because of the value martyrs may place on the monetary and psychological rewards 
that come to their families after their death, an effective deterrent strategy by the U.S. 
must include threatening to punish the families of suspected foot soldiers. Meaningful 
threats of punishment would include targeting either the lives or livelihood of these 
family members. In a recent article by Major General Doron Almog of the Israeli 
Defense Force, Almog gives a poignant account of a particular instance where Israel 
attempted to dissuade a potential suicide bomber by threatening his family: 
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In early 2003 an Israeli agent in the Gaza Strip telephoned Mustafa, a wealthy 
Palestinian merchant in Gaza, to inform him that over the previous three months 
his son Ahmad had been preparing for a suicide bombing mission in Israel. 
Mustafa was told that if his son followed through with his plans, he and his family 
would suffer severe consequences: their home would be demolished and Israel 
would cut off all commercial ties with Mustafa’s company. Neither he nor the 
members of his family would ever be permitted to enter Israel again. Faced with 
this ultimatum, Mustafa confronted his son and convinced him that the cost to 
his family would far outweigh any possible benefits his sacrifice might have for 
the Palestinian people.28 
 
A better-known example is the alleged response by KGB agents for the September 1985 
Hezbollah abduction of a Soviet diplomat. Reportedly, in retaliation for the abduction, 
KGB agents kidnapped and killed a family member of a senior official in Hezbollah. The 
KGB agents removed his genitals and stuffed them in his mouth before returning the 
body to his relatives. After the family of the deceased received his body, the Soviet 
diplomat was quickly released.  
If the U.S. can remove the benefits that suicide bombers’ families receive from 
carrying out an act of violence, it is possible that suicide bombers would be more 
hesitant to engage in that action.  A more meaningful deterrent threat would include 
threatening to kill close family members of a terrorist operative who was identified as a 
perpetrator of violent acts against the U.S. or its interests. If terrorists truly believed 
their actions would result in the death or destruction of their family’s way of life, it may 
deter some of them from engaging in or supporting terrorist violence. 
Irrespective of whether targeted killings are an effective counterterrorism tool, the 
political, legal, and moral legitimacy of these operations are controversial. First, there is 
a history of various U.S. agencies coming under fire for supposed links to assassination 
programs. Most notably, the 1976 Church Committee put pressure on the CIA for its 
involvement in the Phoenix program, which attempted to find and neutralize Viet Cong 
members who were carrying out activities that attempted to destabilize South Vietnam 
during the war. The Church Committee directly confronted questions about how 
necessary strategic objectives reconcile with democratic ideals. The Committee 
concluded that “…assassination is unacceptable in our society” and that it “…was struck 
by the basic tension – if not incompatibility – of covert operations and the demands of a 
constitutional system.”  The Committee was most concerned with efforts to assassinate 
foreign leaders, such as Cuba’s Fidel Castro; however, it is likely that many of the same 
arguments maintained by the Church Committee would emerge in regard to a clearly 
stated U.S. policy of targeted killing. 
From a legal standpoint, targeted killings “walk a thin line.” Assassination is 
prohibited, as a matter of national policy, by Executive Order 12333. This Order states 
that no person acting on behalf of the U.S. Government shall engage in assassination. 
However, this assassination ban provides considerable flexibility and is conspicuously 
imprecise. Targeted killings against legitimate targets who threaten U.S. national 
security, determined by the President, do not constitute assassination and are not 
prohibited by Executive order 12333. For instance, President Ronald Reagan authorized 
the attempt to kill Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi for Libya’s role in the 1986 
bombing of a West Berlin discotheque. President Clinton also relaxed the constraints on 
targeted killings following the U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa. Clinton authorized 
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the use of cruise missiles against targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan in response to 
the attacks. Finally, the current White House has stated that it maintains the right to 
carry out targeted killings based on war powers granted to the president by Congress 
after September 11. Another complexity of the legality of targeted killings is the fact that 
these operations, under international law, cannot be carried out as an act of revenge or 
reprisal for a past event. Targeted killings are only legal if they are done in an effort to 
prevent a future threat to a nation’s security.29 Delineating actual revenge killings from 
killing someone to prevent future threats to U.S. security is a murky issue by itself. This 
is especially true when it comes to dealing with terrorist organizations that wage 
continuous campaigns of violence against an enemy. 
A second dilemma for targeted killings involves the issue of national sovereignty. 
Targeted killings of terrorist leaders and operatives may violate the sovereignty of other 
states unless these killings are authorized by the state in which the killing takes place. 
Some analysts speculated whether Pakistan was informed of the 2006 Predator attempt 
to kill al Zawahiri in 2006 in Damadola.  
A third concern about the U.S. engaging in targeted killings is the condemnation that 
these operations have drawn from members of the international community. Prior to 
September 11, even the U.S. was fairly vocal in its admonishments of Israel’s targeted 
killing policy. In July 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, “We continue to 
express our distress and opposition to these kinds of targeted killings and we will 
continue to do so.”30 Following the 2002 Predator strike in Yemen that killed Ali Qaed 
Sinan al-Harthi, a leading al-Qaeda member and prime suspect in the 2000 attack 
against the USS Cole, many suggested that the Bush administration was moving away 
from the law-enforcement tactics of arresting and detaining terrorist suspects to a more 
controversial policy of targeted killing or extra-judicial killing.  
Soon after the strike on al-Harthi, a United Nations report condemned the attacks. 
The report stated that the attack established an alarming precedent and was a clear case 
of extra-judicial killing and therefore a violation of international law.31 Extra-judicial 
killing refers to the deliberate killing of an individual where it is deemed that 
apprehending and arresting a suspect is not a viable alternative. Similarly, Amnesty 
International claimed, “If this was the deliberate killing of suspects in lieu of arrest, in 
circumstances in which they did not pose an immediate threat, the killings would be 
extra-judicial executions in violation of international human rights law.”32  Other vocal 
opponents to targeted killings by the U.S. and Israel include many Arab and European 
Union governments. Sweden’s Foreign Minister went so far to say that the Yemen strike 
was “…a summary execution that violates human rights. Even terrorists must be treated 
according to international law.”33 Because of the widespread condemnations of targeted 
killings, the perception of the U.S. as an upholder of the rule of law will diminish even 
more than it already has in recent years if the U.S. expands its operations in this area.  
In addition to the legal and political repercussions of the U.S. engaging in targeted 
killings, a more fundamental issue about these practices arises. The U.S. must ask 
whether it wants to be a nation that is associated with targeted killings, assassinations, 
and threatening families of terrorists to establish deterrence. The U.S. has often turned 
to Israel to evaluate its own strategies to defend against terrorism. However, Israel is a 
different case altogether. Israel must approach counterterrorism not from a perspective 
of national security, but from a perspective of national survival. Israel constantly finds 
its society and its citizens’ way of life under siege by Palestinian terrorists. Palestinian 
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terrorists who come from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are only miles from Israeli 
territory.34 This is not to diminish the threat that terrorism poses to the U.S., but what 
may be necessary for Israel may not be appropriate for the U.S. It must be considered 
whether a declaratory policy of targeted killings is fundamentally compatible with 
American core values and morality. This is not a question that should be conveniently 
dismissed as mere fodder for liberal editorial pages or grandstanding speeches by left-
wing academics. It is a legitimate concern that even the most hawkish American citizens 
should at least reflect upon. 
To be sure, a significant reason for the Bush Administration not coming under more 
fire than it did for calling for the capture of bin Laden “either dead or alive” was the 
widespread public outrage over the September 11 attacks. Therefore, as the memory of 
these attacks subsides and the country moves beyond these tragic events, it is unclear 
whether future administrations will be able to successfully convince the American public 
that targeted killings are reconcilable with the core values of the nation. Moreover, it is 
likely that a stated policy of punishing the families of suicide bombers or other terrorist 
operatives would be met with considerable criticism. Threatening individuals who are 
perceived to be innocent and are not guilty of collaborating in an act of terrorist violence 
would be morally repugnant to many, albeit an effective tool to enhance deterrence.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Returning to the theoretical core of classical deterrence theory illustrates the deterrence 
dilemma in which the U.S. currently finds itself. To deter terrorists, the U.S, must ask 
itself two questions. First, what can it do in response to a terrorist attack? Second, are 
U.S. enemies persuaded that the U.S. will actually do what it says it will do? This second 
question represents the “Achilles’ heel” of U.S. terrorism deterrence. Since September 11 
the U.S. has been resolute in its pursuit of terrorist perpetrators. However, has the U.S. 
fully persuaded terrorist organizations that it is willing and able to punish them for their 
actions? Do terrorist elements view current U.S. actions simply as an out-of-character 
“knee-jerk” reaction to September 11? Will U.S. resolve in the war against terror waver, 
as it has in previous wars and conflicts? How much do calls for the U.S. to police its own 
actions in regard to moral and legal considerations undermine its credibility to punish 
terrorist acts? 
The nature of America’s democratic system and the need for retaliation efforts to 
“pass moral muster” continually remind our enemies that they will rarely have to face 
the full consequences of U.S. power. To deter terrorists from attacking the U.S. or its 
interests, the U.S. will have to be prepared to compromise many of its core values and 
conceivably set in motion the moral decline of the world’s lone superpower. In truth, 
many of our enemies must be amazed by some of the debates currently being waged in 
the United States. Debates regarding the humane treatment of suspected terrorist 
detainees, responding in a proportional manner to suicide bombings, upholding the civil 
rights of September 11 suspects, or not directly targeting terrorist perpetrators are most 
likely construed as superfluous discussions by U.S. enemies. Incidents viewed as 
symbols of U.S. heavy-handedness by some Americans, such as Guantanamo Bay or Abu 
Ghraib, may not represent the same thing to U.S. enemies. Robert Kaplan made this 
point recently: “For Iraqis meeting with Americans in Mosul, ‘Abu Ghraib’ had a 
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different connotation than it did in the United States. Here it meant not brutality but 
American weakness and lack of resolve.”35 
Concern over the cost of compromising our ideals undoubtedly undermines efforts to 
make our enemies believe we are willing to punish them no matter at what expense. To 
effectively deter terrorists the U.S. will have to accept the price that comes with violating 
some human rights, responding with overwhelming force, alienating certain allies, and 
even eliminating those assets and people that terrorists may hold dear. Any discussion 
of deterrence that fails to acknowledge the necessity to implement such policies belongs 
only in ivory towers where the theoretical does not have to be tested by the practical. 
Deterring terrorists will not happen with strong policy statements alone, it will only 
happen if the U.S. can clearly illustrate to terrorists and their supporters that they will 
feel significant pain as the result of their actions.  However, as long as arguments about 
the conflict between what is necessary and what is right continue to resonate throughout 
American society, the idea of deterring terrorists, who have no qualms about using pipe 
bombs to blow people up, represents little more than a pipe dream. And even if we, as 
Americans, did suggest that we were willing to sacrifice some ideals to combat terrorists, 
would the terrorists believe us? 
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